Forgotten Warrior Questions:
A CO: CPT Kim
1. Given the four qualities of Marine culture (pg 18), does our unit reflect a similar culture and what can we do to improve our discipline and have Paratroopers take extreme ownership of their responsibilities?

2. Task Force Smith’s early defeats can be related to a lack in discipline. T.R Fehrenbach also remarks on discipline, “Discipline – the self-restraint required not to break the sensible laws whether they be imposed against speeding or against removing an uncomfortably heavy steel helmet, the fear not to spend more money than one earns, not to drink from a canteen in combat before it is absolutely necessary, and to obey both parent and teacher and officer in certain situations, even when the orders are acutely unpleasant.” What can we do at the tactical level to influence a disciplined lifestyle in our Paratroopers?

B CO: CPT Harris

1. Just as the Marine Corps had to fight for existence post WWII is the Airborne fighting for relevancy in and in a high speed strategic conflict that involves a significant amount of armor assets? Is the airfield seizure concept from a conventional force still valid against the significant armor threat that is North Korea or Russia? Is the 82D fighting to be known as “America’s Guard of Honor” rather than “America’s Speed Bump” to slow the onslaught while we establish a beach head at Pusan to get our Armor ashore?

2. Is the Culture of the Airborne enough to sustain us? High OPTEMPO and constant deployments with the emphasis on command climate puts commanders at all echelons in a bind. As we turn to a focused ready force, are we ready on paper or in mind, body and spirit. The Marine culture had that in spades, do we? Does any unit in the Army?

C CO: CPT Sayre

1. The military will always bear a reflection of society, one can argue that society in the 1950s was keener to military service and the values of the Marine Corps. Does the current state of society and our youth make it more difficult to maintain the ethos, culture, and combat effectiveness that was so crucial to the success of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade?

2. In Chapter 2, T. X. Hammes mentions the importance of the culture of the Marine Corps to battlefield success. He quotes General Anthony Zinni and his book, “Battle Ready,” saying that, “The first thing that Marines have to realize is that our service is not vital to the existence of the nation. The second thing we have to realize, however, is that we offer to the nation a service that has unique qualities – qualities and values that the nation admires, respects, and they can ill afford to lose.” How is this feeling on culture relatable to the modern-day 82nd ABN DIV?

3. How do leaders compel an organization that is not at risk of being dismantled to seek out innovations in doctrine and technology in order to remain relevant for the nation’s next war?

4. What is the optimal minimum force to maintain in a peace time Army that will facilitate a rapid buildup of effective combat power, while not detracting from the overall standard and capabilities of the Army?

D CO: CPT Orders

1. There are a lot of similarities between how KMAG and the Military/Police Advising Teams in Afghanistan report capabilities and progress of host nation forces. Is it possible that providing candid observations instead of “highly optimistic reports” could have outright prevented the Korean Invasion? Second, are we repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan?

2. It seems that the infighting between the Army, USMC, Navy, and Air Force did nothing but consume time, money, and other resources that led to a less ready Department of War. To play devil’s advocate, I’d argue that in war time it would make command and control and synchronization of efforts much easier to have all ground forces under one branch. Although we have a theater commander, units at the tactical level are completely disconnected although they might be operating in the same AO. Would unification have really hurt national security interests or were leaders just trying to keep themselves relevant?

H CO: CPT Peplinski
1. In the first chapter we can see how the South Korean Military struggled with maintenance issues and readiness. Additionally, our own forces struggled with a hasty deployment to the peninsula. With readiness of equipment and readiness of Paratroopers as the number one priority for the Army, are we truly in a better position today then we were in 1950? Are we prepared to make up the short falls of our NATO allies or sister services?

2. With the United States continuing to commit forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, if a rapid deployment to North Korea occurred do we see any potential effects with asset allocation? Could there be any potential delays at the strategic level to slow down our deployment to North Korea or derogate our readiness?