All too often, I’ve observed instances wherein the Cavalry Squadron, in conducting reconnaissance for the BCT, culminates prior to answering the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) that inform the BCT Commander’s decision-making. Frequently, this takes the form of the Cavalry Troops impaling themselves on the enemy’s security zone.

Yesterday, I watched an AAR in which a senior leader summed the problem up perfectly. He stated that there are five reasons why a cavalry formation might stop:

1. They reach their reconnaissance limit of advance or achieve their reconnaissance objective

2. They outrun sustainment

3. They outrun communications

4. They outrun fires

5. They encounter an enemy which, with their organic capabilities, they are unable to defeat.

This summation of possibilities perfectly captures the numerous reasons why an Annex L cannot simply contain the information collection plan – this is only a 50% solution. It must also contain the scheme of support to enable this maneuver plan. To be successful, the BCT must enable the Cavalry Squadron with support from the intelligence warfighting function (EAB and organic IC assets to make contact with the smallest element possible), the maneuver warfighting function (attack aviation and armor or infantry attachments depending on the enemy or terrain), the fires warfighting function (artillery and close air support), and the sustainment, mission command, and protection warfighting functions (Role II, FLE, RETRANS, and ADA positioning). Planners must ensure that reconnaissance and security operations do not become a ‘Cavalry Squadron-fight,’ but instead conduct the necessary COA Development and COA Analysis (i.e. wargaming) to ensure that it becomes the ‘BCT-fight’ that it is.

Attached is a teach slide developed to communicate this idea for staff planners to use, if interested.

Thoughts?