S4: How did the enemy exploit sustainment weaknesses to contribute to the US withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter?

The NKPA was, obviously, far more prepared for war than the ROK and its allies on 25 June 1950. The United States had pulled the majority of its troops and civilians from the peninsula prior to this event. Even on the night of the attack, soldiers and leaders were on leave or enjoying themselves out on the town. From a logistics standpoint, the ROK wasn’t ready for a conflict, period. Although they were tagged as the “best damn army outside the United States”, they had no tanks, no medium artillery, no 4.2-inch mortars, and no recoilless rifles. They had no spare parts for their transport. They had zero combat aircraft. Along with poor logistical assets, the American leadership lacked in experience and training. They abused their power; making it to high positions just by being drafted.

On the night of 25 June 1950, the NKPA made their initial attack and began driving south. They were demolishing ROK army for one reason, tanks. The NKPA were rolling through ROK defenses. The ROK had no answers for these tanks. They had no air or anti-tank assets. Soldiers tried their best executing suicide missions trying to explode the tanks with mines or trying to pry their way into the hatches. These attempts failed miserably.

The biggest mistake from the South Korean perspective was leaving assets to the north of the river and destroying the bridges above Seoul. After the first invasion began, Americans began to evacuate. The fifteen hundred vehicles belonging to Americans, both government and private, were abandoned; no effort was made to turn them over to the ROK Army, which desperately needed them. More than twenty thousand gallons of gasoline were abandoned in the embassy motorpool. A tremendous amount of food, valued at $100,000, and the entire July quota of liquor-$40,000 worth, tax free—were left for the Inmun Gun. Trapped by the premature blowing of the Han bridges, 44,000 men of the divisions north of the river would die or disappear. Their vital artillery and equipment would be lost with them.

To sum up the logistical aspect of the initial invasion and the American retreat, there were no logistical plans in place. This invasion was executed at a perfect time by the north. The invasion was successful until the U.N. got involved and called in support from the U.S. stationed in Japan. Even then, the American people didn’t understand this conflict, much less bought in to supporting this conflict like the past two World Wars. The combination of these things paved the way to a rough conflict in Korea.