S4: How did the enemy exploit sustainment weaknesses to contribute to the US withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter?

1. The United States Army was in no shape or form ready to “fight tonight.” Prior to the NKPA initial strike, the overall attitude of the US forces on the ground was described as a “disorganized mob, clamoring to go home” (Fehrenbach 21), with low morale and hardly any discipline. With that kind of attitude do you think the US forces were doing the proper maintenance on there already limited equipment? I highly doubt it. It seems like there were barely any sustainment systems in place by the KMAG.

2.  The KMAG didn’t fathom the idea that North Korea would strike. Without the fear of being attacked, the US forces had no motivation or sense of urgency to rehearse war drills (alerts). Without testing combat readiness down to the sustainment level it is clear that US forces were ill prepared. This led to many resources (food, vehicles, gasoline, etc) being left behind when the Han River bridge was blown up during the retrograde. If there was an actual retrograde plan, these mission essential supplies would have been evacuated and brought to the rear. With limited sustainment, it was easy for the North Korean forces to charge south all the way to Pusan.

3. We did not have the right resources on hand to combat the tank threat. With 0 tanks on peninsula and very limited anti-tank capabilities, the US forces did not have the necessary tools to effectively engage the enemy.