S3: What factors made Korea vulnerable and appealing for military occupation? What geopolitical factors in the 20th century led Korea’s invasion and occupation in June 1950?

In Chapter 2 “The Crime of Marquis Ito” Fehrenbach goes into some detail into the history of the independence of the Korean Peninsula, which he often refers to as “Chosun”. Korea has and will always remain a buffer state;  jutting southeastward from Chinese Manchuria, falling in the eastern maritime province of Russia, and lastly from Japanese perspective “Chosun is a dagger, aimed eternally at her heart”. As result of this strategic geographic disposition, Fehrenbach argues that Korea is to be forever doomed as a breeding ground for War, as evidenced in its three modern wars on the peninsula as power forever shifts between these three nations, as well as the United States. While there were many factors that contributed to the vulnerability to Korean occupation, those factors most influential to the Korean invasion and occupation stemmed from a paradigm shift in United States foreign policy; these fundamental changes resulted in inconsistencies in policy, which paved the way for the invasion in June 1950.

Between pages 28 and 29 Fehrenbach discusses the differences between the US and USSRs basis for fighting in WWII; the US fought this War just as it had WWI, as a crusade. The USSR on the other hand, fought WWII on the basis of power, whereas WWI was fought over survival. Because of this Fehrenbach argued the USSR was able to “win” the peace, and later Korean occupation. Immediately following the distribution of Korea at the 38th parallel Russia continued on its pathway to power, while the US struggled in unfamiliar territory. “Wars of containment, wars of policy…are hard to justify unless it is admitted that power, not idealism, is the dominant factor in the world, and that idealism must be backed by power.” In saying this, Fehrenbach explains the necessary shift in US culture required to allow this new foreign policy to properly function. Rather than commit to this approach, the US eventually lobbied for the United Nations to replace its occupational forces on the Southern Peninsula and withdraw influence almost entirely.

The conversation of the impact of geopolitical factors leading into the invasion and occupation of Korea in June of 1950 can be argued from a plethora of standpoints. Ultimately the United States failed to identify the significance of the Korean peninsula in the east, especially in regards to the country’s investment in the Japanese Islands. Failing to properly implement foreign policy from the proper organizations left too many parties in the dark:  The USSR, US people, as well as the US Military. Because of this the military also failed to recognize the potential for a Korea-Korea based conflict, failing to learn lessons from the Chinese civil war. Individuals were not in the positions they needed to be, serving in the capacities their organizations were intended to do so.