Section 2: Pick from one of the following three questions and respond.

HAMMER: During the battle of Osan Soldiers of TF Smith talk about how their bazooka rounds “burned out against the thick Russian Armor without penetrating.” The narrative Fehrenbach gives us is the equipment was too old and the Russian armor to strong. Challenge this. Look at the steps required to put a bazooka into operation and the armor stats on a T-34 tank. What else could have caused the bazooka rounds to have no effect? What parallels can you draw between the Soldiers of TF Smith and our own Soldiers/Leaders?

S2: TF Smith, while cocky and poorly disciplined, was ill prepared to deal with the NKPA armor threat.  They were using old ammunition from old WW2 delivery systems, making them ineffective against T34 tanks.  Even 105’s in direct lay didn’t have enough ammunition to be effective.  Why did the US not know or understand the armor threat in Korea already?  Where was the national level intelligence apparatus to collect such information?  Why didn’t the US not equip the US Forces to deal with one of the biggest threats (armor) of the war?  Are we not doing the same thing today with respect to the CBRN threat (decon, limited equipment on Penn, training aides, actual atropine and associated lotions)?

S3: What warfighting functions contributed most to Americans’ continual defeat and withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter in the summer of 1950? Answer generally or focus mainly on Task Force Smith for examples to support your analysis.