S2 Questions: A significant contribution to the failure of US intelligence services to prepare for the Korean threat can be attributed to the remaining “war weariness” that afflicted the US immediately following the conclusion of the Second World War, as well as an overreliance on nuclear forces. Even as the KMAG forces were pushed forward to Korea and the US negotiated a solution to the division of the peninsula with the USSR, US war supplies were being moved from the Pacific back to the continental US. Ferenbach implies that American strategic planners made the assumption that US nuclear power would be sufficient to deter aggression on the ground. Ferenbach writes “The American Army had developed improved 3.5 inch rocket launchers, which would penetrate the T-34. But happy having designed them, it hadn’t thought to place them in the hands of the troops, or of its allies. There just hadn’t been enough money in the budget for long-range bombers, nuclear bombs, aircraft carries, and bazookas too.” (p. 81.). It may be valuable to compare this situation to the present-day failure to fully prepare for the CBRN threat, and there is certainly a mindset that we will simply “figure it out” with respect to issues such as supplying water to forces in a CBRN environment.