S3: What warfighting functions contributed most to Americans’ continual defeat and withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter in the summer of 1950? Answer generally or focus mainly on Task Force Smith for examples to support your analysis.

While arguments may be made for each of the warfighting functions contribution to the Americans’ continual defeat and eventual withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter in the summer of 1950, examples provided from Task Force Smith support the lack of sustainment/protection and mission command.

Task Force Smith deployed with approximately 400 soldiers, each of these soldiers were issued 120 rounds of ammunition a piece and 2 days of C rations. In addition to these soldiers and riles it was equipped with two 75mm recoilless rifles, two 4.2 inch mortars, six 2.36 inch rocket launchers, four 60mm mortars, along with six light howitzers which only had six anti-tank rounds.  Because of these lackluster and outdated supplies such as the 2.36 inch rocket, the task force was immediately doomed for failure. Of all the assets it contained leading up to the morning of 5 July, the only piece of equipment it had on hand that could destroy the NKPA’s T-34 tank were those six anti-tank rounds. This lack of sustainment including the inability to provide the task force with the new 3.5 inch bazooka was detrimental; unable to destroy the initial column of T-34s, task force smith saw an immediate penetration of its lines, which reached the 52nd Field Artillery Field over 2000m to their rear in what seemed to be a matter of minutes. Unable to sustain contact with the enemy and lacking any and all ability to damage the T-34s, the tsk force was able to delay the nK advance for only 7 hours. Sustainment directly effected protection in the inability to prevent the T-34 tanks from immediately penetrating the line established by Col. Smith, and thus his ability to preserve the task force’s integrity.

Once the T-34s penetrated the initial line emplaced by task force smith, it was doomed for failure. With the movement and penetration of the T-34s came the destruction of radio lines between the task force, this coupled with old equipment destroyed by the rain and Col. Smith was no longer able to communicate with his forces and integrate the units under his command. Assuming that the artillery was destroyed by the T-34s Col. Smith lost an invaluable asset that could have allowed him to continue fighting, or at least facilitate the withdrawal of his soldiers once his flanks were overcome. Instead once his soldiers attempted their withdrawal, they were immediately met with enemy machinegun fire and almost all killed. In this mass hysteria of little to no communication essential equipment such as the recoilless rifles and other crew served weapons were left behind;  by the next morning Col Smith could only account for 185 men, and of those men almost 9 of 10 left their weapons behind not to mention their other equipment. It was because of this lack of control the withdrawal immediately grew into chaos once soldiers came under fire, something that was amplified without the aid of artillery.