I chose the S3 question:

Multiple warfighting functions led to the defeat of American forces in the Summer of 1950 on the Korean Peninsula. First and foremost, mission command played a factor. The beginning of the conflict displayed that there was not an efficient division of reponsibility between the US and ROK forces as “Fat Chae” was soon pushed out of his position and MacArthur immediately stepped up to essentially control all military forces on the peninsula. “This Kind of War” details many Soldiers in Task Force Smith and their actions when they became under attack on the Battle of Osan. The author describes many Soldiers retreating as soon as they were under heavy contact instead of holding their positions while disobeying orders from their Company grade officers.

Next, it was revealed that the DPRK was overwhelmingly more effective in their movement and maneuver function. The North Korean maneuver units were not only better led with more decisive leadership, but also they had better trained Soldiers who could operate their equipment effectively especially in the case of the T-34 tank.

In terms of the intelligence function it seemed that the US/ROK forces were not well prepared or equipped with the knowledge of the capabilities of the North Korean armor forces. American Soldiers soon learned that their anti-armor capabilities were outdated and could not effectively destroy the T-34 tank. Additionally, American leaders were not spun up on the maneuver strategies of the North Korean army which would have led to a better understanding of the next move of their opponent. In terms of fires, the US forces realized that their indirect fires were not capable of producing destructive effects on target but only slightly disoriented them. All in all, it was quickly revealed that US/ROK forces were unprepared, poorly led, and ineffectively trained to handle the invading DPRK units.