S3: Warfighting Function

I would have to say the lack of Mission Command was the essential Warfighting Function that led to ROK/American withdraw to Pusan.  This pertains to both the art and science of command.

Art of Command:

There seemed to be no strategy before and during the initial nK push into South Korea.  As Fehrenbach addresses, the Pentagon seemed  to be living in an optimistic (unrealistic)  viewpoint of the American and Korean forces.  They never had a true picture of the forces on the ground and therefore could not provide the Art of Command to win any war, no matter the technological gap between the Americans and nK forces.

Science of Command:

The Americans were not ready for nK forces through both equipment and tactics.  The inadequacies of the American equipment has already been addressed in depth throughout the discussion so I will focus on the tactics.  American doctrine at that time was suited for the environment of Europe, not the mountainous terrain of the Korean Peninsula or against NKPA tactics.  Example is of General Dean’s forces focusing being pinned from a frontal attack and getting enveloped on the sides and rear.  While this is a simple example, throughout the beginning stages American leadership would be “thinking of the old Army, not the forces of 1950.”