ABLE:  What is your response to the steadfastness of MacArthur’s insistence on the Inchon landing? How does it change, had the mission gone otherwise?

From the outset of the Conflict, General MacArthur understood the limitations tactically with the emplacement of ground forces; immediately, MacArthur thought of how to incorporate his superior Naval and Air assets to defeat the nK aggressors. By instructing his Chief of Staff General Almond to begin planning an amphibious operation in the summer of 1950 General MacArthur was already preparing the US for the major success seen on September 15th. Originally planned for 22 July, General Almond was most like able to present MacArthur a plethora of detailed assault location each with sufficient intelligence for each landing site (reports indicated it was lightly defended). General MacArthur was thinking strategically from the outset of this operation, which led to his seemingly adamant and ignorant refusal to accept approach other than an assault on Incheon. Seeking to cut of the nK forces nerve center, General MacArthur’s end state was the recapture of Seoul; thus, being only 18 miles away from his end state, Incheon’s fate was sealed.

In contradiction to Fehrenbach’s claim that General MacArthur was, “fighting from behind his five stars and his enormous prestige as America’s leading field commander.” I feel MacArthur had placed the right leaders in the right places to execute the plan that they had already developed themselves (named General Almond as X Corps commander), and leaned heavily on his experience during the Pacific War. This is evident in his quote in regards to the Navy, “The Navy has never turned me down yet, and I know it will not now.” Even Fehrenbach agreed that US ground forces were extremely limited in ground tactics as evidenced in WWII from 1944-45 describing Wehrmach, and later in the US’s inability to contain the forces of an illiterate nation of nine million people. Originally the provisional marine brigade for an amphibious assault, he was forced to divert them to the peninsula to save the 8th army. At the time of Operation Bluehearts, 7th Infantry division was the only one of its kind not committed to the peninsula, but had still been gutted of officers and crucial NCOs sent to the peninsula instead. Standing up the units for Operation Bluehearts from scratch, the units involved in the assault on Incheon were the only ones General MacArthur had left; as a result, Operation Bluehearts had to be as audacious as it was.

If Operation Bluehearts wasn’t as successful as it was, the immediate results would be seen at the position of General Almond. Because of his opinion as to how quick the assault on Seoul would take, MacArthur kept General Almond in both his postion as Chief of Staff of FECOM, as well as of X Corps. General MacArthur would have to decide how he would restructure his immediate chain of command while also having to determine where he would take his fight to next. Lastly, one of the greatest concerns would be the evaluation  of General MacArthur’s ability to lead his forces any longer after refusing to consider his subordinates guidance as well as that of JCS. Overall, if his assault on/through the port of Incheon had been unsuccessful, it is hard to say exactly what would change, aside for the fact that the entire landscape of the war and most likely the Republic of Korea would have been destined for a different outcome than we know it to be today.