HAMMER: As UN forces marched north, there was evidence of the Chinese joining the conflict. Despite the evidence, General MacArthur and his staff believed “the Chinese would not dare intervene” They assessed that they lacked the Military capability to bring significant forces into the conflict and even if that was possible the US air superiority would make quick work of them. What do you think we are “wishing away”? What are capability or piece of equipment are we putting too much reliance on?

MacArthur’s assessment that he provided to President Truman at Wake Island was one of poor intelligence that he believed strongly because of what he wanted to believe. As told in “This Kind of War” FECOM was under the impression that it was too late for the Chinese to intervene as they believed that on “14 October the U.N. forces in North Korea stood very close to total victory.” FECOM believed that the Chinese would see the war just as they were that it was much too late for intervention as the war had already been won. Major General Charles Willoughby, the FECOM S-2, issued his study of the question of Soviet and Chinese intervention which revealed his belief that because North Korean forces weren’t rebuilding quickly it must be determined that the greater Communist forces had decided against intervention.

Essentially, the failure of the US to judge the ability and desire for the CCF to enter the conflict rested upon the fact that we failed at estimating the importance of the Korean peninsula to Communist forces. Instead of viewing the conflict as a political struggle, the US was determined to view it purely as a struggle of two military forces. This tunnel vision not only led to the deaths of many US Soldiers in the coming battles late in the fall and winter of 1950 but potentially led to the stalemate that we continue to share today in Chosan. Additionally, the US intelligence community vastly underestimated the Chinese Communist Forces and their professionalism. As Fehrenbach writes, “the major leaders of the Chinese Communist Forces, were not simple peasant leaders…the vast majority of the CCF generals were graduates of Whampoa Military Academy or of Russian schools.” The refusal of the American intelligence community and leadership to accept the fact that the Chinese were involved in Chosan was one of the greatest mistakes, possibly the greatest, during the Korean War. MacArthur’s insistence that air power would be able to overcome the CCF again displays one of his qualities that were to his advantage and his disadvantage, his stubbornness. Fehrenbach writes, “too late, he would find out what Lin Piao already knew-against a Communist army, in primitive terrain, air power could be important, but not decisive.”