HAMMER: As UN forces marched north, there was evidence of the Chinese joining the conflict. Despite the evidence, General MacArthur and his staff believed “the Chinese would not dare intervene” They assessed that they lacked the Military capability to bring significant forces into the conflict and even if that was possible the US air superiority would make quick work of them. What do you think we are “wishing away”? What are capability or piece of equipment are we putting too much reliance on?

Today’s forces in Korea are still making many of the same mistakes that were made by MacArthur and the UN forces just before the Chinese pressed their attack south.  Similar to back then, at the moment the Army is completely convinced that we will at all times have air superiority and that the use of our air assets will be decisive enough to achieve great strategic ends should a conflict erupt.  This over-reliance on air power to bring about strategic goals has not worked in any conflict to date, with the most notable examples being Korea and Vietnam.  The other piece of equipment we rely far to heavily on is our armor capabilities.  The case is laid out clear and simple that the farther north our forces go, it becomes a mountainous fight that is utterly not conducive to an armor fight.  However, our current priorities all lie around maintaining and operating heavy armor in a conventional ground campaign on terrain where we should be focused on mountain warfare and counter guerilla tactics.