<span style=”color: #111111; font-family: Georgia, ‘Times New Roman’, Times, serif; font-size: 12px;”>HAMMER: As UN forces marched north, there was evidence of the Chinese joining the conflict. Despite the evidence, General MacArthur and his staff believed “the Chinese would not dare intervene” They assessed that they lacked the Military capability to bring significant forces into the conflict and even if that was possible the US air superiority would make quick work of them. What do you think we are “wishing away”? What are capability or piece of equipment are we putting too much reliance on?</span>

MacArthur operated on a continuing theme of US arrogance in regard to ground war in Asia. The severely restrictive terrain would have made movement by a western army impossible in any sort of fighting posture. Thus he discounted the ability of PRoC to move 100,000s of men in night movements, unseen in the terrain. In addition, he placed too much faith in air power, both as fire support and as reconnaissance. He dismissed these problems because he was unable to accept that to fulfill its commitments, America would have to fight slugging, hand to hand combat the further you pressed north. This is a fact that men of the period were unable to accept politically or tactically. Lastly, and most importantly, Truman allows MacArthur to make a political guess with basically no information and who has no qualification to do so. There is no fidelity from the State Department about Chinese strategic goals or the likelihood of their intervention. The is no advisement from the CIA about Chinese troop movements. There is no centralization of intelligence and political analysis in the executive branch whatsoever. MacArthur expects the hammer to fall if China enters and the PRoC correctly assumes that Truman has no stomach for it. On peninsula we have made our position unassailable but we continue to lag behind in human intelligence and long range analysis of our enemies. Crucially, there remains no strategic vision for US strategic policy in Asia or in the rest of the world. We bounce on the spoils system from one administration to the next with little continuity. The State Department remains as useless and disconnected from the use of force as ever. Our generals remain either as MacArthur, unqualified to make analysis own their own or forced to tow a political line that has little basis in reality either tactically or strategically. We must either hold our civilian masters accountable for the analysis we are due or frankly admit that their petty interference endangers not only our soldiers but the Ship of State itself.