Activity

  • gdc1355 replied to the topic Section 4: This Kind of War in the forum 1-5 Cav 6 years, 5 months ago

    <span style=”display: inline !important; float: none; background-color: transparent; color: #111111; font-family: Georgia,’Times New Roman’,Times,serif; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration: none; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;”>As UN forces marched north, there was evidence of the Chinese joining the conflict. Despite the evidence, General MacArthur and his staff believed “the Chinese would not dare intervene” They assessed that they lacked the Military capability to bring significant forces into the conflict and even if that was possible the US air superiority would make quick work of them. What do you think we are “wishing away”? What capability or piece of equipment are we putting too much reliance on?</span>

    Currently, as a military, we are “wishing away” the CBRN-E threat posed by North Korea. Since the assassination of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam, the true scope of the CBRN-E threat posed by North Korea is unclear and has without a doubt, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. The chemical agent found to be Kim Jong Nam’s cause of death was Nerve Agent VX. Nerve Agent VX, or venomous agent X,  is colorless, odorless, and most importantly a persistent chemical. By deactivating a particular enzyme Nerve Agent XV causes neurotransmitters to mass and essentially poison an individual’s nervous system. Treatment for Nerve Agent XV is not long or extensive, depending on the dosage, but must be administered or death is imminent. Individuals exposed to will be taken out the fight whether or not they are in the correct MOPP posture and therefore decrease a unit’s combat strength. With North Korea being the primary suspect in the assassination of Nam questions rise on the nation’s true chemical capabilities. This is truly a staggering revelation and as an Army, we are not ready to face a multifaceted chemical threat. Soldiers arriving mid-rotation missing CBRN-E equipment, leadership not properly trained on chemical attack procedures, the lack of a company and platoon CBRN-E MOS, and a couple other reasons depict our lack of readiness in regard to the possible chemical threat North Korea poses.