FSC- FSC: Discuss the three advantages the CCF possessed over UN Forces

As told in “This kind of War,” Fehrenbach describes the advantages that the CFF possessed over the UN Forces as: “having their own minds, trained to war in the vast reaches of the middle kingdom, which instinctively thought in terms of fluid maneuver, without regard to the battle line; the hardihood and sturdy legs of their peasant troops, who could travel long miles on very little, and the enemy’s complete lack of belief in their own existence. ”

With that being said, I interpreted Fehrenbach’s first advantage as the Chinese being properly trained and well prepared for the primitive environment the peninsula had to offer as well as being tactfully sound. The loyalty and discipline amongst the ranks of the Chinese were unmatched, as the reward for any reprisal was death. With respect to the Chinese, “In bivouac, no man showed himself, for any reason. Discipline was firm and perfect. Any man who violated instructions in any way was shot.”
Furthermore, the Chinese were deliberate in their approach to UN Forces as they would march by night and rest by day in order to ensure their movement was concealed. Examples of their deliberate movements can be seen when Fehrenbach’s goes onto mention that, “when light came, every man, every gun, and every animal, was hidden from sight. In the deep valleys, in the thick forests, in the miserable villages huddled on the forlorn plateaus, the Chinese rested by day.”
The fact of the matter was, the Chinese were well accustomed to the terrain and the atrocities of war.

The second key advantage the Chinese had over the UN was their ability to operate in most physically demanding conditions with the least amount of resources. Due to the limiting factor of traveling by night, the Chinese were forced to cover vast distances in the shortest amount of time. “After dark, not sooner than nine o’clock, the Chinese troops began to march… They plodded south, night after night, for eighteen nights. Each night, between nine and three, they covered eighteen miles.” In essence, the Chinese knew how to work with what they had, and make the most out of it.

The third key advantage the Chinese had over the UN was no real doing of their own. Essentially, the UN underestimated the capabilities of the Chinese to retaliate, and therefore did not even consider the possibility. Fherenbach mentions how, “Neither MacArthur nor Willoughby believed the Chinese would intervene in force; both believed the Chinese threats were purely diplomatic blackmail… how Americans believed it incredible that any army of significance size could cross the Yalu and deploy in Korea without observation by their air forces.”