S2: TF Smith, while cocky and poorly disciplined, was ill prepared to deal with the NKPA armor threat.  They were using old ammunition from old WW2 delivery systems, making them ineffective against T34 tanks.  Even 105’s in direct lay didn’t have enough ammunition to be effective.  Why did the US not know or understand the armor threat in Korea already?  Where was the national level intelligence apparatus to collect such information?  Why didn’t the US not equip the US Forces to deal with one of the biggest threats (armor) of the war?  Are we not doing the same thing today with respect to the CBRN threat (decon, limited equipment on Penn, training aides, actual atropine and associated lotions)?

The U.S. understanding of the capabilities of NKPA was limited, but only because of the lackadaisical approach to the NK threat and the fear of soviet expansion in Europe possibly leading to another World War. That is not to say that Nk didn’t effectively mass combat power in secret, but a greater focus on NK, not only militarily but diplomatically, would have revealed their true intention. The same logic applies to the quality of equipment U.S. forces in South Korea used during 1950. NK was not seen as a legitimate threat therefore funding towards the effort was cut. In today’s fight, the CBRN threat is real, but unless actual intent to use them was assessed we are not getting pushed better equipment.