Hammer: As UN forces marched north, there was evidence of the Chinese joining the conflict.  Despite the evidence, General MacArthur and his staff believed “the Chinese would not dare intervene” They assessed that they lacked the Military capability to bring significant forces into the conflict and even if that was possible the US air superiority would make quick work of them.  What do you think we are “wishing away”?  What capability or piece of equipment are we putting too much reliance on?

At the moment we are wishing away the possibility of conflict with the North.  It seems that we are allowing equipment and manning to be passed away as “normal”.  The CBRN possibility is being addressed, however, it is only being addressed as a reaction versus a proactive action.  It seems these rotations are only seen as a 9 month period of keeping broken equipment sustainable until the next unit appears.  In the book, the US was “wishing away” the Chinese intervention and the capabilities of the North and difficulties of terrain and fighting that would soon be at hand.

The US seems to put too much reliance on air superiority, however, the reliance is necessary.  Wars cannot be won without air superiority, however, it cannot solely be won with that.  Ground must be seized and controlled in order to prevent the enemy from regaining that ground.  The fights that the ground forces would face would prove to be difficult as the forces in the South would be pushed back to the Pusan Perimeter.