HAMMER: Korea was the first war where the US Army rotated Soldiers in and out of theatre in significant numbers, a practice that has continued ever since. In doing so, practical and instructional knowledge is lost and lessons have to be re-learned, sometimes at great cost. How would you change the manner in which we now rotate Soldiers into different conflicts across the globe? Are the benefits worth the cost, when our enemies remain in place and continue to learn? What are the pros and cons of each system?

I would argue that the American Army is unrivaled in force projection capabilities. Korea, Vietnam, and the GWOT efforts demonstrated America’s ability to plant divisions on the opposite side of the world and consistently defeat the enemy at the tactical level. Fehrenbach argues that our losses in Korea were unacceptable, being that neophytes were far more likely to die than the vererans who had the hard-won lessons of keeping weapons clean, security awake, and patrols alert.

While the United States Army was being punished for their rotation of Soldiers into a combat zone in Korea, the Army continued the practice in Vietnam, placing people into units on a year timer to redeploy without consideration of the value added to the unit. I believe with the advent of the digital age and the real time collection of information from battlefield to theater command negated the value of keeping veterans in theater. As Iraqis initiated asymmetric warfare in Sadr City, Army leaders changed training models at Combat Training Centers to match the tactics that the enemy were employing on the ground.

No tactical formation demonstrated the advantages of completing the information cycle faster than SOCOM. Much has been written about GEN Stanley Mchrystal’s work in Iraq, creating a living information system that continually struck terrorist organizations based upon action intel. The Rangers executed nightly ambushes to keep the enemy off balance but unlike clumsy patrols in korea than may or may not have ended in contact, the Rangers of the 21st century were armed with relevant and recent intell that facilitated a constant feedback and attrition of enemy forces.

Obviously, heavy brigades are not SOCOM and one could ask what information loop we are creating in theater. Many LTs would say that all we are doing is coming in and recreating the wheel with each rotation. I would say that the benefits outweigh the costs considering we can share the load and knowledge across the force as units return and SMs PCS to other units. I would not change the rotation model until there is a smaller independent Army Task Force that can deploy. Additionally, a unit that experiences a deployment will be far more adaptive than one stagnating in theater. These rotations, theoretically, could force the Army to come together using the same systems. Accountability is just a word until leaders inspect equipment, TTPs, and discipline. I believe rotations are a better forcing function to analyze equipment readiness being property exchanges hands. TTPs can be built through published doctrine and action after reviews of units in theater.