HAMMER: Korea was the first war where the US Army rotated Soldiers in and out of theatre in significant numbers, a practice that has continued ever since. In doing practical and instructional knowledge is lost and lessons have to be re-learned, sometimes at great cost. How would you change the manner in which we now rotate Soldiers into different conflicts across the globe? Are the benefits worth the cost, when our enemies remain in place and continue to learn? What are the pros and cons of each system?

In my very limited experience and reading I believe the rotation model works for combat deployments.  What units loose in unit cohesion, experience and theater subject matter experts they regain in sustainability of the human cost to soldiers.  The old WWII style of deployments for the “campaign” while effective in producing lethal and effective units took a much higher toll on our soldiers.  However due to the cuts leading to the decreased size of the force in the last decade we have forced our Army to adopt a rotational BDE model to not only our two wars but also to a myriad of “global presence” commitments (Korea, Eastern Europe, Kuwait etc.).  From reading I believe the intent is to give soldiers and units a 2:1 “home station” to “away” (whether on rotation or deployment) ratio.  The problem lies in that this 2:1 system is not perfectly adhered to, and there are other requirements in that “2” time that pile on to both units, soldiers, and families.  Currently from observation I believe this system works in a three phase manner.

With redeployment the unit just got home; whether from rotation or deployment and soon has to pick up the red cycle commitments that their post has in order for the army machine to continue to operate.  What this means for the soldier is likely less than a month after “getting back” they are sent  on details either to other posts or locally, units from the platoon level all the way to brigade are emptied, by both details and PCS and ETS.  Shortly after a unit returns home they are almost entirely emptied out, leadership changes are often implemented in mass “hockey subs” and very little if any institutional knowledge is retained.  Following this units are filled up with soldiers in fluxing, seemingly hardly ever to full MTOE capacity then the train up cycle begins.  Several field exercises are completed in sequence, new platoons, new companies, new battalions all learning at once how to operate in a cohesive and effective manner.  After several months of this hurried pace they are sent to NTC, or JRTC typically and then prepare for their deployment/rotation.  Following this the unit then deploys or rotates for 9 months.

The current issue I believe is the decreased size of the force while maintaining the same level of global commitments that we as an Army had a decade ago.  This is an issue constantly played out in history of armies “beefing up” for conflict often through not preferred means, and then “shrinking down” once the conflict is complete.  By using this model you loose leaders and soldiers with a wealth of knowledge and those that remain in the force are needed to fill in the gap where these soldiers once stood.  The army has a whole looses effectiveness and cohesion by perpetuating this cycle.  I believe the solution is a macro one, an increase in force size and a commitment as a nation to both fund and maintain that force.  The constant flux is what kills us.