HAMMER: Korea was the first war where the US Army rotated Soldiers in and out of theatre in significant numbers, a practice that has continued ever since. In doing practical and instructional knowledge is lost and lessons have to be re-learned, sometimes at great cost. How would you change the manner in which we now rotate Soldiers into different conflicts across the globe? Are the benefits worth the cost, when our enemies remain in place and continue to learn? What are the pros and cons of each system?

The topic of the readiness and utility of the rotational brigade vs. the forward-stationed Brigade is a difficult argument to be had, although it has been highlighted most recently by the former 2ID CG General Ted Martin and Dr. John Deni of the Army War College. Dr. Deni uses his analysis of four pillars to discuss the effectiveness of a rotational Brigade compared to a forward-stationed one, they are: fiscal costs, diplomatic factors, family readiness and well-being, and unit training readiness. General Martin, on the other hand, argues in favor of the rotational unit in favor of a rotational brigades combat readiness at the completion of its deployment. Based on Dr. Deni’s study, one of the major concerns of the US government was the cost of a forward-stationed unit, arguing that a rotational unit would cost less and thus favored the approach dating back to the Bush administration, and continued into the Obama administration. Based upon his findings, Dr. Deni found that the heel-to-toe rotational presence cost more than a forward-deployed brigade; funds that we are currently in desperate need of.

Readiness is ultimately the most important part of our deployment, as well as any other units deployment to a foreign country. In General Martin’s argument, he claimed that 2ID would receive an already “good” BCT, and when the unit would complete its rotation, it would return as, “the most combat-ready brigade combat team in the Army”. Prior to deploying the the ROK, of the 9 command team positions of our A, B and C companies, 6 of the positions were held by brand new leaders who had conducted a training exercise with the BN at that position. With the Brigade not “fenced in” prior to our deployment, we lost readiness when soldiers and leaders of qualified crews and squads came under orders or reenlisted for a new duty station. Had soldiers and leaders remained in their positions that they qualified in during Gunnery, CALFEX and the units NTC rotation; it could be argued that the unit was more prepared heading into the deployment than a forward-stationed BCT would consistently maintain.

It is difficult to argue either side unless an emphasis is placed on either fiscal feasible and efficiency, or instead on combat readiness. In my opinion the rotational brigade does in fact increase overall readiness so long as leadership and manning changes are controlled and change-overs occur at the appropriate times. The mind-set and predetermined time frame allows soldiers to have a different focus on the task at hand. We as a unit just need to do better to conduct the battle hand-over with our heel-to-toe counterparts, not only the couple months prior, but the unit that will replace the unit that replaces us. Only then can that unit properly train and resource so that they can already be properly trained before they arrive to the peninsula. This would have consisted of more air-assault missions during platoon STX and CALFEX during our battalions gunnery density, as well as proper and consistent training on the UGF training site offered to us at Fort Hood. As always hindsight is 20/20, but these are some personal lessons learned.