S3: Given the protracted conclusion of the war, who would you consider its winners in 1953? How about 2017?

According to UN economic data, South Korea’s 2016 GDP is approximately $1.4 trillion, while North Korea’s GDP is an astonishingly low $12.4 billion. Per capita, the average South Korean produced approximately $37,000/year, while the average North Korean produces $1,700/year. This staggering disparity between two formerly equal nations, and the subsequent quality-of-life indicators that follow, provide an excellent primary indicator of which belligerent “won” the Korean war in the present day.

When discussing victory in war, I would argue that it is vital to consider the initial goals and objectives of each party to the conflict. In Korea, the North (guided by their Sino/Soviet supporters) desired a unified Korea under a communist regime. Expulsion of US Forces from Korea was a necessary part of achieving this goal, but was certainly not an objective in of itself. Rather, the central goal of Northern efforts was the unification of the peninsula.

Simultaneously, American goals in Korea were not primarily focused on unification of the peninsula but rather a preservation of the Post-WWII balance of power between the US and USSR in the Pacific. While the focus on the term “police action” and the insistence on “punishing” the North for their wanton aggression may indicate that lofty ideals were the guiding factor in the intervention, the American haste to occupy Korea following the Japanese surrender shows clearly that Korean self-determination was not of much concern to American planners and politicians. Acting with foresight, the US recognized the geo-stratigic importance of friendly military presence on the peninsula. A fully Sino or Soviet Korea would mortally threaten American military presence and alliances in Japan and Taiwan, and the fear of a military (rather than simply political) “domino effect” was quite justified.

The only argument to be made for a Northern “victory” either in 1953 or 2017 is that they have succeeded in developing nuclear weapons. This is hardly unprecedented however, and by treating the evolution of this conflict as an issue of deterrence rather than one of nonproliferation the US may be able to progress in our methods of handling the problem of North Korea. While the Kim regime has shown to be tyrannical and inept domestically, they have not yet proven to be irrational actors either domestically or internationally. As such, the development of nuclear weapons does not truly change the calculus that must be made by the US and South Korea — it merely changes the magnitude of the sacrifice necessary for war  and decreases the likelihood of conflict.

Considering the conflict through this lens indicates clearly who the victors were in the Korean War both in 1953 and today – The South Korean people and the American Military. An institutionalist might even claim that “values” of “sovereignty” and “international law” as enforced through UN action were a victory for the entire free world, though I would stop short of that argument.

Looking forward, it may be prudent to consider who would be the “winner” of a modern conflict between North and South. Barring an escalation by Chinese intervention resulting in a full-scale international conflict, it is inevitable that a war with North Korea would have three results: A dismantled Kim regime and US/ROK control of the DPRK, mass civilian and military casualties in the South, and a subsequent humanitarian and economic crisis far worse than the fall of the Berlin Wall. Were such a conflict to occur, the North would lose everything. However, the costs for the US/ROK would be immense, and for relatively little gain.