1) I have never attempted deception as a Platoon Leader as a tank/scout/distro PL. In the mechanized world, I feel that every action is deliberate and leaders believe that ground will be contested simply because the mission is an attack, or that the enemy will attack, since the mission anticipates a defense. This mentality limits creativity, such as a deception operation.

Deception would be easier for a dismounted formation than a mounted, where there are more elements to move. I am interested to hear if others have had success at deception at the company level. On one force on force mission, we sent one Bradley forward to deceive the company, where he rushed along an IV line and the main force flanked. While this worked on a small scale level, I doubt a commander would commit to using one vehicle as bait.

2) EW, IO, and cyber are all resources that are being shifted to the Brigade level in armored brigades.  That being said, I believe that units will enforce some sort of SOP to mitigate risk of signal compromise, such an SOP should be pushed/enforced/managed by the higher echelon for a subordinate unit to refine. I am interested to see what the Army produces in the coming years for our FM, HF, and digital systems.

3) Using historical examples, I will cover only mission command and intelligence for this portion.

a) Mission Command: Deception within Mission Command can consist of minimizing details within orders to obscure overall intent of operation or by pushing orders during movement to maximize secrecy of an operation. Both Civil War generals Grant and Jackson minimized details of their operations to feint and hide their true objectives within operations. Grant’s operation at Vicksburg caught the Confederates by surprise and his subordinates were ignorant of his true intent until they crossed the Mississippi. Similarly, Jackson kept his plans close to his chest until execution as he demonstrated at Chancellorsville.

b) Intelligence: accurate and timely intelligence can ensure that the enemy “takes the bait” of a deception operation. With the success of the Ultra program, the Allied Powers of WWII consistently understood what the German Armed Forces were thinking. The success of D Day was largely due to the subterfuge utilized by the Allies to deny the Germans knowledge of the amphibious landings. The establishment of fake commands, such as “” under George S. Patton denied the Germans understanding of who, where, and what the Allies would deploy their forces. Operation Fortitude, an Allied misinformation campaign, led the Germans to believe GEN Patton was the First United States Army Group commander and that his intent for the European invasion was to land at Pas de Calais.