Thanks for the feedback, as you are driving a great deal of introspection as I attempt to either defend my ideas or embrace a new, more accurate paradigm.

There is a common misconception that by developing graphic control measures and time- or condition-based triggers for the integrated employment of combat power, combined with an expectation of centralized execution during this synchronization, we have completely abandoned mission command. It’s this misconception that I am seeking to attack. While the higher commander synchronizing the operation IAW commander’s intent, he is ordering his subordinates to achieve an effect at a specific time and location so as to overwhelm the enemy with his combined combat power. His subordinates might chafe at this idea, lamenting about how they are being told ‘how’ to accomplish their mission and that these detailed instructions do not align with their notions of mission orders.

To an extent, they are right. In a complex operation, such as a combined arms breach, there is little room for decentralized execution. If subordinate formations are not working in precise concert with each other, they risk desynchronizing the operation — suppressive fires and obscuration fires end too early, the breach force arrives at the breach site before conditions have been established, the assault force does not assault through the breach immediately following the obstacle’s reduction, reducing the tempo of the attack.

Yet, several of the principles remain in place. The Commander having issued a Commander’s Intent remains the framework for the overall operation in the event that the situation changes. Subordinates remain aggressively proactive, exercising disciplined initiative by providing recommendations for deviations or adjustments to the plan, based on observations and identification of emerging opportunities or threats at the lowest levels.

I have observed over 20 BCTs conducted the combined arms breaches at the National Training Center. Of these, zero that were successful were the result of decentralized execution by battalions and below. I conducted six combined arm breaches as an OPFOR MIBN Commander during Troop Command at 11^th ACR. In a formation where the level of cross-talk and coordination between subordinate leaders far exceeds that of any BLUFOR BCT that I have observed and a culture of mission command is particularly strong, success was still largely derived from detailed planning and the use of condition-based triggers, graphic control measures, and synchronization by the BTG staff.

As units train and fight together develop increasing capability and shared understanding of how they, as a formation, fights, they reduce the number of instances wherein detailed command and control is required. Further, commanders develop a trust in the competence and capabilities of their subordinate leaders, again reducing the number of instances wherein they need to assert more control over the operation. This development takes time. But to expect that we approach complex tactical problems unwavering commitment to decentralized control, regardless of the complexity of the problem or the capabilities within our formation is not accepting prudent risk.
For further reading, I strongly recommend an excellent related piece by MAJ Amos Fox: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2017228_art011.pdf