HAMMER: Korea was the first war where the US Army rotated Soldiers in and out of theatre in significant numbers, a practice that has continued ever since. In doing practical and instructional knowledge is lost and lessons have to be re-learned, sometimes at great cost. How would you change the manner in which we now rotate Soldiers into different…[Read more]

Fires: The Chinese treated all POWs the same regardless of rank. This resulted in the degradation of discipline among POWs. Do you think this was the intended outcome or just 2nd and 3rd order effects? In addition what would you do to combat the loss of morale among POWs?

I do not believe that the Chinese specifically intended for their POW…[Read more]

Charlie: What do you think soldiers thought of their leadership at this point in the war? Why?

As many have pointed out, I believe the important issue to discuss is the disconnect between BN/BDE leadership and CO/PLT leadership. Company and platoon leadership traditionally have a tough time looking up at higher leadership and viewing in a…[Read more]

S4: How did the enemy exploit sustainment weaknesses to contribute to the US withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter?

The NKPA devised their plan to quickly and powerfully overwhelm any forces they came into contact with on their drive down into the South. They did this on purpose because they knew how the ROK was ill-prepared for a defensive e…[Read more]

HAMMER: As UN forces marched north, there was evidence of the Chinese joining the conflict. Despite the evidence, General MacArthur and his staff believed “the Chinese would not dare intervene” They assessed that they lacked the Military capability to bring significant forces into the conflict and even if that was possible the US air superiority…[Read more]

ABLE: What is your response to the steadfastness of MacArthur’s insistence on the Inchon landing? How does it change, had the mission gone otherwise?

One factor that can separate a win from a loss is audacity. Obviously It is one of the 4 fundamentals of the offense used in small scale maneuvers, but one can also look at it on a much larger…[Read more]

S2: TF Smith, while cocky and poorly disciplined, was ill prepared to deal with the NKPA armor threat.  They were using old ammunition from old WW2 delivery systems, making them ineffective against T34 tanks.  Even 105’s in direct lay didn’t have enough ammunition to be effective.  Why did the US not know or understand the armor threat in Korea al…[Read more]