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  • nst replied to the topic Section 7: This Kind of War in the forum 1-5 Cav 7 years, 5 months ago

    HAMMER: Korea was the first war where the US Army rotated Soldiers in and out of theatre in significant numbers, a practice that has continued ever since. In doing practical and instructional knowledge is lost and lessons have to be re-learned, sometimes at great cost. How would you change the manner in which we now rotate Soldiers into different conflicts across the globe? Are the benefits worth the cost, when our enemies remain in place and continue to learn? What are the pros and cons of each system?
    The cons of this system are wholly in the realm of political necessity and budgets; the cons are wholly in the realm of readiness and training. No, the benefits are not worth the cost.
    For Korea I would return to PCS moves (18-24 months) so unit leadership gets a good understanding of the mission and personnel get a good chance to maintain equipment and train. To have a BDE rotate every 9 months results in only about 6 months of effective duty when you consider deployment and redeployment of personnel and equipment. Such a change would also aid in training with host nation forces and a real understanding of the human and natural terrain that would be required should the balloon actually go up. This same structure should be applied to other regions where our military is fulfilling treaty obligations, such as Europe. A return to Reforger- where forward deployed personnel set the stage for Stateside units to practice deploying- would most likely the best option, if only the political and financial will for it existed. That way you have a baseline of knowledge for the AO and can plus up numbers should the need arise.
    For other conflict areas I would look at not just the military obligation but also at any civil support that has been lacking. Over the past 16 years the military has become a one stop shop for many issues while other government agencies have atrophied. Additionally, if it is untenable to maintain a military force for a longer period of time, perhaps making the leadership or key personnel more permanent would assist with a lack of institutional knowledge.