How to Speak Doctrinally Without Putting Soldiers to Sleep
THE DILEMMA
When Platoon Leaders brief Operations Orders (OPORD), their briefing styles typically fall into one of three categories: a doctrinal style, a layman’s style or a teaching style. The doctrinal style has the advantage of being easily understood by adjacent units and commanders, but will quickly put soldiers to sleep and creates confusion when it comes to execution. The layman’s style has the advantage of being easily understood by soldiers, but not understood by adjacent units or commanders. Lastly, the teaching style, where leaders speak doctrinally but take the time to define and explain terms as they brief also has drawbacks. The teaching style allows for a shared understanding between soldiers and leaders, but often also doubles the time a briefing takes because the Platoon Leader (PL) is taking the time to explain every doctrinal term. All three briefing styles have significant draw backs in that either soldiers don’t understand the operation, leaders don’t understand the operation or the briefing takes valuable time out of the Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) process. This article proposes a way to solve this OPORD Dilemma by providing a training plan for PLs to train their platoons on doctrine and the ‘language of an OPORD’ so they can use a doctrinal briefing style and create shared understanding across their formation, a Mission Command principle.1
The underlying reason for this dilemma between several undesirable briefing styles is that soldiers — and often many Non Commissioned Officers — have a poor understanding of doctrine, were never taught doctrine in the first place at the Basic Leader Course or the original doctrine they were taught is now out-of-date. This is compounded by the fact that most leaders assume that soldiers and NCOs arrive at a line unit with a solid understanding of key doctrinal terms and the language of an OPORD, so they never take the time to conduct OPORD training while in a line unit. Furthermore, OPORDs are typically briefed prior to a mission when time to ask questions is limited by the fact that Pre Combat Checks, Communications Checks and other pre-mission prep needs to be completed.
A practical solution to this dilemma is to conduct training on key doctrinal terms and the language of an OPORD as part of a units normal training cycle at the company and platoon levels. The challenge is that training schedules are often filled with training time for battle drills, sling load training, Expert Infantryman Badge tasks and other tangible skills. Training doctrinal terms and the language of an OPORD often take a backseat to these more immediate.
TRAIN AND VALIDATE PLATOON LEADERSHIP
Company Commanders could begin by giving a refresher class to the Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants (PSGs) on doctrinal terms and the language of an OPORD. Commanders are best suited for this task since they have recently graduated from the Captains Career Course and can explain the most up-to-date Army doctrine and incorporate their experience as a PL. A good place to start would be a thorough discussion of the paragraphs, sub-paragraphs, key doctrinal terms and any recent changes. Time can also be spent discussing different tactical tasks, forms of maneuver, graphic control measures, symbols, and techniques for building an effective Terrain Model. The commander may also find it beneficial to conduct a Leader Professional Development (LPD) session with the platoon leadership that discusses articles such as, Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail: When CONOPs Replace OPORDs, which discusses the consequences of poor planning.2
After conducting a class with the platoon leadership, the Company Commander could conduct a practice operation where the PLs would act as Squad Leaders and the Company Commander act as a PL. The commander would go through the entire TLP process one day, and then conduct the mission the following day or during PT if time was tight. A simple mission such as clearing an Enemy Observation Position a few kilometers away would allow for TLP fundamentals to be trained.
Once the Company Commander is confident that the PLs and PSGs are prepared to teach their platoons, the platoon leadership can then get to work developing a POI for their platoons. Special attention should be given to discussing the scope of what should be taught to the soldiers in the platoon since a leader could spend years teaching all of the doctrinal intricacies.
EXECUTING AT THE PLATOON LEVEL
Squad Leaders typically make excellent instructors because they are senior enough to incorporate their experiences which helps show soldiers that the information is relevant, but also junior enough for the soldiers to easily relate to. However, most Squad Leaders haven’t been taught doctrine or the language of an OPORD before, so it’s important that the PL and PSG invest the time upfront to train and validate the Squad Leaders before they get in front of the platoon to teach. Each Squad Leader can be responsible for teaching parts of the OPORD as well as other key doctrinal terms. Following the classes, a simple written test would help ensure that soldiers have a basic understanding of what was taught. The PL could then develop simple missions for each squad to practice the OPORD process and implement the execution of the mission into PT. The PL and PSG can observe squads and as Squad Leaders and Team Leaders become proficient at briefing and leading doctrinally, junior soldiers could begin to fill leadership roles. Platoon leadership can then take advantage of doing ‘one up’ drills when conducting Platoon Situational Training Exercises and have Squad Leaders act as the PL or PSG.
BENEFITS BEYOND THE PLANNING BAY
A critical role of NCOs in a platoon is to make informed recommendations to their PL throughout the TLP process. Often this takes the form of NCOs providing recommendations using non-doctrinal terms which wastes valuable time and are not nearly as meaningful to their PL or Company Commander. As a PL I conducted similar training to what is described in the article and saw tangible benefits with my platoon, especially when it came to how my NCOs communicated recommendations. The example below is a comparison of how my Weapons Squad Leader communicated his recommendation to me after we had conducted the doctrinal training and then an example of how he would have described the same situation if he not conducted the training.
During a Brigade Training Exercise my platoon was given the task of Ambush by our Company Commander with the purpose of disrupting the enemy’s main advance during a defense lane. My Weapons Squad Leader made the following recommendation and as a result, destroyed the enemy’s main effort with few friendly losses (Situation).
“Sir, the terrain will restrict us to a risky near ambush and limit our ability to reposition if the enemy uses a different COA. I recommend we conduct an Attack by Fire which will better meet the commander’s purpose. It will also allow us to better utilize our weapon systems, allow for greater flexibility and greatly reduce the tactical risk.” (Doctrinal)
“Sir, we should move further away because there are too many trees and it will be difficult to see the enemy and engage and we won’t be able to make use of our longer range weapon systems. Also, if the enemy comes down a different way then we may not be able to readjust to attack them and they may actually have the upper hand on us. We’re also going to be very close which will result in high casualties. I think we should go to that hill over there because it will be better.” (Non-Doctrinal)
Providing informed recommendations to leaders who have less experience, but more doctrinal knowledge is a dilemma other professions face as well. For example, in the medical field a nurse’s relationship to a new doctor is similar to NCOs and PLs; in that, nurses do not have as much formal training as doctors, but often have more experience, especially when working with a new doctor. It is critical though that nurses communicate their recommendations using the language of their profession as opposed to trying to explain themselves in a non-doctrinal way. The consequences of poor communication in the medical field and the military are similar — critical time is wasted when every second counts because lives are at stake. Below is a medical example of an interaction between a trauma nurse and a doctor.
A trauma nurse noticed one of her patients had unexpectedly deteriorated and had to quickly communicate to the doctors what the problem was; as a result the patient was stabilized. (Situation)
“I assess the patient has a grade three splenic laceration after an MVC and vitals showed he was hypotensive, tachycardic, tachynpneic, and had a rigid abdomen. I recommend we conduct a rapid NS bolus, a type and screen, and a CBC.” (Doctrinal)
“I assess his spleen has been injured, but is not beyond repair. He had low blood pressure, high heart rate, and increased rate of breathing and his abdomen was abnormally hard; these factors indicate internal bleeding. I recommend conducting blood tests to see how much blood he has lost and a blood type test so blood could be prepared for transfusion. I recommend you quickly increase the fluid volume in his body so he can continue circulating blood and get him to the operating room to begin surgery.” (Non-Doctrinal)
CONCLUSION
By ensuring the basic language of an OPORD is understood at the lowest level, future OPORD briefings for Platoon Live Fire Exercises, National Training Center rotations and deployments will help ensure briefings are understood by both soldiers and leaders and put the ‘brief’ back in briefing. Furthermore, NCOs will be able to make doctrinal recommendations to their PLs and PSGs that are more easily understood and more likely to get approved by their leadership.
References:
1 Department of the Army. 2012. “ADRP 6–0: Mission Command.” http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adrp6_0.pdf.
demands, but the lack of training creates issues down the road when a platoon goes to plan and conduct a mission. An example Program of Instruction (POI) could be based on what is taught in a Basic Officer Leadership Course and tailored to your units’ branch.
2 Doherty, Thomas. 2012. “Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail: When CONOPs Replace OPORDs.” Small Wars Journal. August 28. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/failing-to-plan-is-planning-to-fail-when-conops-replace-opords.
This Article is written by 1LT Luke Hutchison. Luke is currently the Brigade Assistant S-1 for 2nd IBCT, 4th Infantry Division. Luke is a West Point graduate from the class of 2013 and is an Infantry Officer.
