Yes, Clausewitz Still Matters for Today’s Lieutenants

With modern conflict exposing the impact of drones, precision-guided munitions, and real-time intelligence, it can be tempting for young officers to believe that modern conflict has little connection to wars of the past. While Soldiers must adapt to the changing character of warfare, neglecting its enduring nature would be imprudent. Even as soldiers field new equipment and prepare for a more advanced battlefield, lessons about the nature of war remain critical to understanding what lies ahead.

Nearly two centuries ago, General Carl von Clausewitz warned against a mindset that placed too much emphasis on technology and doctrine. From entering the Prussian Army at age twelve to fighting against Napoleon Bonaparte, Clausewitz observed that war is inherently a human endeavor, shaped by friction, decision-making, and leadership. In an Army where young officers spend much of their early careers in TRADOC or training rotations, Clausewitz’s lessons from On War provide lieutenants with an essential framework for understanding the nature of war.

Friction and the Fog of War

In 1806, Clausewitz witnessed Napoleon dismantle the Prussian Army, a force that appeared formidable on paper and was touted as one of the most disciplined in Europe. The Prussians possessed experienced officers, elaborate doctrine, and drilled formations. However, historians note that when the Battle of Jena–Auerstedt began, Prussian orders arrived late, units maneuvered to the wrong positions, and officers hesitated at decisive moments.[1]

Experiences like this one led Clausewitz to conclude that war is governed by “friction,” a term that describes the combined effects of fatigue, fear, weather, poor information, and human uncertainty, among other factors. As he famously observed, “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”[2]

For junior officers, Clausewitz’s warning is clear: friction is not an anomaly that can be eliminated, but the environment in which they will be tested, no matter the advancements of technology or doctrine.

Genius and Initiative

Because war is, in Clausewitz’s words, “movement in a resistant medium,”[3] mastering the fundamentals of one’s profession becomes especially important for lieutenants. Technical competence provides officers with the foundation to make timely, effective decisions under pressure.

However, Clausewitz argues that competence in one’s skills is only a starting point. He champions the concept of military genius, which he defines as the combination of coup d’œil (the intuitive ability to grasp a situation) and resolution (the courage to act decisively).[4] The Prussian general observed that Napoleon exemplified these traits more than any of his adversaries, often acting faster than his opponents, exploiting fleeting opportunities, and accepting risk when others hesitated.

For lieutenants, this lesson suggests that warfare cannot be treated as a mechanical exercise. Clausewitz’s wisdom indicates that doctrine and TTPs provide structure, but it is judgment and initiative that determine whether a leader can adapt when plans break down. In a junior officer’s early career, training events that incorporate uncertainty, friction, and after-action reviews provide an invaluable opportunity to cultivate coup d’œil and strengthen resolution. Whether executing a patrol, coordinating a live-fire exercise, or managing logistics under pressure, each experience is essential to improving judgment and resilience.

Moral Forces and Psychological Endurance

As important as military genius is in battle, Clausewitz argues that moral forces often prove even more decisive in war. By moral forces, he refers to the collective will of an army, including its morale, cohesion, and shared sense of purpose. While serving alongside Russian forces during Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, Clausewitz witnessed the horrors of warfare firsthand: massive casualties, starvation, exhaustion, and bitter cold. Experiences like this one convinced him that “moral elements are among the most important in war,” because they “form the spirit which permeates the whole being of war.”[5]

To endure war’s treacherous nature, Clausewitz suggests that soldiers should possess “energy, firmness, staunchness, strength of mind, and character.”[6] At the core of these traits, he believed, was mental resilience, noting that a “strong mind is one which does not lose its balance even under the most violent excitement.”[7]

The account of Clausewitz’s experiences in Russia invites lieutenants to confront the realities of combat before they encounter them. His narrative challenges junior officers to examine whether their reasons for serving are strong enough to endure war’s realities.

Leadership and Responsibility

For officers, cultivating personal resilience alone is not enough. In moments when soldiers are exhausted, afraid, or uncertain, Clausewitz contends, it is the business of the commander to maintain the moral forces of his army.[8] He emphasizes that morale flows directly from leadership, noting that the commander’s spirit is impressed upon the whole army.[9]

The Prussian General observed this responsibility and the effect of strong esprit de corps as he watched Russian forces continue fighting against Napoleon’s army despite catastrophic losses and extreme cold. While strategic and political factors shaped the campaign’s outcome, the moral resilience of Russian soldiers was a critical factor in sustaining the defense of the state during the 1812 invasion.

As officers in charge of soldiers, Clausewitz’s lessons suggest that lieutenants would benefit from emphasizing a culture rooted in resilience, cohesion, and high morale. Whether developed through physical training, shared hardship, or strong relationships, such cultures require continued attention, particularly when conditions are at their worst, as Clausewitz observed.

Learning and Failing

While junior officers should always strive to improve across every domain of officership, Clausewitz’s story shows that mastery of leadership and warfare is never complete. At the time of his death, Clausewitz did not consider On War a finished work. Despite more than three decades of military service, he believed his thinking was still evolving and intended to revise and refine his ideas.[10] For lieutenants, Clausewitz offers an example of intellectual humility and a commitment to continuous learning.

As junior officers prepare to operate within the fog of war, TRADOC, rotations, and training exercises become more than rehearsals; they are the crucible in which judgment, discipline, and habits are formed. By sharpening decision-making in training and deliberately reflecting on mistakes, Clausewitz suggests that lieutenants can prepare themselves to lead decisively when clarity is absent and consequences are real.

[1] Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 464–471.

[2] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. Graham (Project Gutenberg, 2005), Book I, Chapter 7.

[3] Book I, Chapter 7.

[4] Book I, Chapter 3.

[5] Book III, Chapter 3.

[6] Book I, Chapter 3.

[7] Book I, Chapter 3.

[8] Book III Chapter 4

[9] Book III Chapter 4

[10] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham (Project Gutenberg, 2005), Editor’s Preface.

Author Bio: 1LT Noah Jager is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and earned a master’s degree from the War Studies Department at King’s College London as a Rotary Global Scholar. He is currently stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, serving in the 199th Infantry Brigade.

Photo: Wilhelm Wach, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons