I agree with all the above posts that provide great insight. I’d like to expound on some from an HHC CDR perspective.

1. Engage in continuous learning. Whether day 1 or day 365, ensure you have a mechanism to constantly assess yourself and the S6 team. You’ll receive direct feedback from the XO and BN CDR but you can also seek feedback from the…[Read more]

Armel,

The above posts hit all the right points. Know you equipment, know your soldiers, and know how it fits into the overall mission. As a commander, I would love it when staff sections would ask me to get in on their training. For example, if you as an S-6 go to the training briefing and see Company X is out doing a range maybe you can ask the…[Read more]

Hello Eric,

You pose a great question. Transitions are tough, especially in your situation with the lack of battle handoff. I agree with Mark that you have to establish a knowledge baseline and learn effectively.

Expanding on Mark’s PIR comment, what exercises and/or deployments are on the short-range/long-range training calendar? What other…[Read more]

S3: The Korean War’s winner in 1953 and 2017 was the DPRK. At the conclusion of fighting in 1953, the largest loser was the South Korean people. They had their Army annihilated at the outset of the war, their people suffered a short but brutal occupation by communists, and then strong-armed into an armistice. America failed them at nearly every…[Read more]

HAMMER: Korea was the first war where the US Army rotated Soldiers in and out of theatre in significant numbers, a practice that has continued ever since. In doing so, practical and instructional knowledge is lost and lessons have to be re-learned, sometimes at great cost. How would you change the manner in which we now rotate Soldiers into…[Read more]

ABLE: What is your response to his tale of the Glousters, and how does that influence your perspective on the U.S. Army’s use of regimental affiliation?

The tale of the Glousters was highly inspiring, being that their NCOs and Officers served together for life. They shared experiences through each conflict. What I found most moving was closing of…[Read more]

S3: This section contains accounts of very competent brigade and battalion leadership under immense pressure. Choose a leader from this section and write about how their example contributed to the success of their unit in the action discussed in Chapters 22-24. Leaders include COL Freeman, LTC Faith, LTC Ray Murray (USMC).

Having participated in…[Read more]

This is widely position and rank dependent in my opinion – a PL and a Staff Primary and a Commander will have widely different experiences and required preparations. I always try to remind myself of what is the Right way of doing business (doctrine, regulation) vs. the SOP (the way We do things in the unit, office, Bde, etc.), and start to…[Read more]

@celineoh, you’re absolutely right that interactions in a classroom and drastically different than ones face to face. I learned this as a cadet when I got back to my room one day to find my roommate taking her routine afternoon nap. But as I came in, another friend of ours was also in the room and it turns out they were talking about some pretty…[Read more]

FSC: Discuss the three advantages the CCF possessed over UN Forces. What can we learn from them?

The CCF’s primary advantages came down to the principals of the offense: speed, concentration, audacity, and tempo. Their primary advantages were surprise, concentration, and audacity and that outset of their intervention. Due to MacArthur’s…[Read more]

S3: What role did initiative play for UN Forces in the Pusan Perimeter and their subsequent breakout?

Initiative was regained by MacArthur with his landing on Incheon. While Walker fought to maintain his forces tactically in the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur shifted the balance of power by taking the fight to the DPRK’s rear with a landing west of…[Read more]